On Wed, 20 Feb 2008, Jeff Zeitlin wrote:
Suppose the IGDC says 'ten points per choice on the ballot'. In the example above, each voter can share 40 points among the four choices. So, the first voter goes with Z=20, I=12, M=6, S=2. The second voter goes with S=12, M=11, I=9, Z=8.
These sorts of methods, if you presume strategic voting, tend toward every voter giving each entry either the maximum or minimum number of votes, (i.e. break down as approval voting); and you didn't even list a maximum other than the number of points, so this will break down to plurality voting (i.e. each voter gives all points to a single candidate.)
Approval voting and plurality voting have different (and, IMHO, worse) strategic voting vulnerabilities than Condorcet methods like the ranked-pairs method we currently use.
Wikipedia has a pretty good set of articles about voting methods. For the curious, this is a good place to start with evaulating different methods by the criteria they fulfill.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion#Criteria_in_evaluating_single_winner_voting_systems -- Dale Sheldon dales@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx