Dale Sheldon writes: > On Wed, 20 Feb 2008, Jeff Zeitlin wrote: > > > Suppose the IGDC says 'ten points per choice on the ballot'. In the > > example above, each voter can share 40 points among the four choices. > > So, the first voter goes with Z=20, I=12, M=6, S=2. The second voter > > goes with S=12, M=11, I=9, Z=8. > > These sorts of methods, if you presume strategic voting, tend toward every > voter giving each entry either the maximum or minimum number of votes, > (i.e. break down as approval voting); and you didn't even list a maximum > other than the number of points, so this will break down to plurality > voting (i.e. each voter gives all points to a single candidate.) This may be naive, but I think the fact that the votes are public will help to discourage strategic voting. A truly exaggerated assignment of points (or skewed ratings using range voting, i.e. all 10s and 0s) will stick out like a sore thumb. --dougorleans@xxxxxxxxx