I'd just like to point out that you express a concern about the effects of voting strategically under the Condorcet or ranked pairs method, then you propose a different system and tell people how they should game it.
On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 2:18 PM, Dale Sheldon <dales@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Tangentially related, since a year and a half ago (when I aggresively argued about how we should count the votes for these things) I've done a lot of reading on voting systems (William Poundstone's "Gaming the Vote" in particular), that has changed my opinion about Condorcet and ranked pairs.
I'd now like to advocate for score voting (every voter gives a score on some scale (0-5, 0-9, 0-99; doesn't really matter*), highest average score wins**.)
*Strategically, you should always give your favorite candidate the highest score and your least-favorite the lowest possible score (usually 0), even if you don't consider them to be the best (or worst) game _ever_; you're only comparing the games within the contest, not all games across all time.